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1.  Introduction  Resilience as challenge 
 Resilience principles 
 Situation awareness 
2. Ships‘ Navigation 
 System 
 Carriage Requirements 
 System for Detection and Indication of Threats 
 Threat Management  
3. Case Studies  Resilience by additional capacities 
 Resilience by tolerance 
 Resilience by flexibility 
4. Summary 
Resilience of engineered systems reflects the 
required system ability 
 to well-function with the needed performance 
 to adapt the operation to changing conditions 
 to withstand interfering influences 
 to rebound from disruptive & destructive effects 
Resilience as Challenge 
ISIS MTE 2019 DLR.de  •  Chart 3 
Ships navigation system 
HMI HMI 
data 
processing 
facilities 
data 
processing 
facilities 
receivers 
(com/nav) 
receivers 
(com/nav) 
sensors 
receivers 
(com/nav) 
data 
processing 
facilities HMI 
sensors sensors 
data 
sources 
data 
sources 
data 
sources 
as 
technological 
system 
control 
use 
install 
configure 
maintain 
repair 
as socio-
technical 
system 
Resilience Principles and Concepts (Theory) 
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  Principle Capability  Attribute 
1 absorption to absorb the magnitude of disruption  
capacity  
2 physical redundancy to overbridge single failures by redundant layout 
3 functional redundancy to provide different ways to perform critical tasks  
4 layered defence to apply two or more independent principles 
5 human in the loop to use humans’ better dealing with unprecedented threats  
flexibility  
6 reduction of complexity to limit the complexity to the necessary degree 
7 reorganization to adjust structure and functioning to current situation 
8 reparability 
to be prepared for recovery of origin functionality and 
performance 
9 loose coupling to limit error propagation in complex, networked systems 
10 localized capacity to perform the functionality using distributed resources 
tolerance 11 drift correction to mitigate risks by adjustment to changes 
12 neutral state to ensure true situation awareness for right decisions 
13 inter-node interaction 
to ensure communication, cooperation, collaboration 
between nodes for a coordinated use of resources  
cohesion 
14 
reduce hidden 
interactions 
to avoid harmful interactions between nodes 
Principles 
 In the last decades the 
resilience community 
identified more than 40 
principles  
 Jackson identified 14 top 
level principles in an 
abstract manner 
 
Resilience targets [Jackson] 
 to survive a threat (capacity) 
 to adapt to a threat (flexibility) 
 to degrade gracefully in the face of threat 
(tolerance) 
 to act as unified whole in the face of 
threat (cohesion) 
Resilience concepts [Wood]  
1) robustness 
2) ability to rebound and recover 
3) as opposite to brittleness (during operation  
near or beyond its capacity limits) 
4) sustained adaptability of functioning and 
operation in a changing and networked 
world  
Resilience Principles and Concepts (Practice) 
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Resilience criteria  
 
“functionality” = ship navigation 
- during voyage 
- during life cycle 
 
“performance” 
- safe  
- efficient 
-   with negligible emissions…. 
system status 
e
x
te
rn
a
l 
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s
 
n
o
rm
a
l 
a
b
n
o
rm
a
l 
operative inoperative degraded 
robust 
ability to rebound 
and recover 
”survive a threat” 
threat 
opposite to brittleness 
“degrade gracefully” 
sustained adaptability 
“act as unified whole” 
 
Situation Awareness 
 is a human concept driven by increased requirements for human 
(more complex tasks/systems; changes, new/unexpected threats) 
 reflects the human need to be aware of certain aspects of the 
world  to make critical (and right) decisions  
 
 
 
 
 is a dynamic process triggered by the current situation awareness 
(new findings) and applications requesting/using these new 
findings  
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Digitalization and 
automatization of ships’ 
navigation system 
Spatial & temporal frame of SA 
Objects of interests 
Implication to be assessed 
Current/emerging situation 
Nautical Tasks 
Applications 
[Lundberg]  
True situation awareness 
(resilience, safety, security) 
= 
machine-made functions  
+ human-made activities 
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4. Summary 
Ships‘ Navigation System 
Carriage requirements, threat detection,  threat management…. 
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Carriage requirements (SOLAS V R.19) 
and backup recommendations 
 ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and 
Information System): up to date paper 
charts or a secondary independent 
ECDIS device,  
 magnetic compass: a spare magnetic 
compass independent of any power 
supply, 
 X-Band radar: S-Band radar 
 ARPA: a second automatic tracking aid 
to plot automatically the range and 
bearing of other targets 
Threats to safety of navigation 
 nature-related: heavy weather, 
storms, waves etc. 
 traffic-related: collisions, 
grounding 
 societal: piracy, cyber terror 
Dealing with threats 
 Robustness of equipment 
 Backup solutions  
 Provision of special services e.g. ice 
control, weather, VTS, (FOC) to improve 
navigation …. 
 
Need of enhancement 
 different threat detection strategies 
 design/acting as whole (system approach) 
OOW = Officer on Watch, VTS = Vessel Traffic Service, FOC = Fleet Operation Center 
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4. Summary 
Principles 
• absorption 
to absorb the magnitude of disruption   
• physical redundancy 
to overbridge single failures by redundant layout 
• functional redundancy 
to provide different ways to perform critical tasks  
• layered defence 
to apply two or more independent principles 
 
Resilience by additional capacities (1) 
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Case study  
(a) physical redundancy 
use of same technologies for the redundant system 
branches: 
• equal dependencies on errors and threats 
• correlated behaviour in the face of threats   
(b) functional redundancy 
use of different technologies for the redundant system 
branches: 
• non-correlated dependencies on errors and threats 
• individual behaviour in the face of threats   
 
 
Resilience by additional capacities (2) 
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Simulation Setup (N=100.000 epochs) 
 
System 1 
95% 
MED(c) 
usability 1 
correctly identified 
unusable system  
used 
other 
System 2 
95% 
MED(c) 
usability 2 
correctly identified 
unusable system  
used 
usable system as 
unusable identified 
unusable system as 
unusable identified 
 Generated random numbers 
used as criteria of usability or 
unusability (outside 95% value 
range) 
 Random numbers follow the 
normal distribution 
 Nominal distribution of system 1 
and 1’/2 is correlated (CF 0…1)  
 MED(c) is considered as one 
function, correctness is 
determined based on random 
numbers of normal distribution 
Resilience by additional capacities (3) 
 most benefit, if redundant 
system branches are 
uncorrelated in relation to 
threats (blue,CF=0: R=99,75%) 
 the benefit is lost,  
 if redundant branches are 
fully correlated 
(blue,CF=1: R=95%) 
 if MED(c) makes a 
random selection of used 
branch (black dashed line) 
or 
 MED(c) is effectively an 
extension of the system and 
influences the reliability of 
the whole system 
 a high correctness of 
MED(c) is necessary to 
achieve any improvement 
of reliability (green curve 
vs. pink curve) 
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CF = Correlation Factor, R = Reliability 
Resilience by flexibility (1) 
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Principles 
• localized capacity 
to perform the functionality using distributed 
resources 
• drift correction 
to mitigate risks by adjustment to changes 
• neutral state 
to ensure true situation awareness for right 
decisions 
 
Case study  
(a) physical with more or less functional redundancy as used in the first case 
study 
 
(b) Monitoring and evaluation is done separately per each redundant system 
branch 
• non-correlated dependencies on errors and threats 
• individual behaviour in the face of threats   
 
 
Resilience by flexibility (2) 
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Simulation Setup 
 
System 1 
95% 
ME1 
usability 1 
correctly identified 
unusable system  
used 
other 
System 2 
95% 
ME 2 
usability 2 
correctly identified 
unusable system  
used 
usable system as 
unusable identified 
unusable system as 
unusable identified 
 Generated random numbers 
used as criteria of usability or 
unusability (outside 95% value 
range) 
 Random numbers follow the 
normal distribution 
 Nominal distribution of system 1 
and 1’/2 is correlated (CF 0…1)  
 ME1 and ME2 are considered 
as independent functions, 
correctness is determined 
based on random numbers of 
normal distribution 
Resilience by tolerance (2) 
 If MED(c) as well as 
ME1/ME2 operate error-
free, the kind of 
implementation has no 
influence  on reliability.   
(blue curve ) 
 The sensitivity against 
reliability of MED(c) 
reduces, if it is performed 
with distributed resources 
ME1, ME2 and switch. 
(green, pink, and purple curves ) 
 Also here the benefit is lost,  
 if the correctness of 
ME1/ME2 sinks below 
80% (brown curve) 
 if redundant branches are 
strongly correlated 
(CF1) 
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CF = Correlation Factor, R = Reliability 
Resilience by tolerance and flexibility (1) 
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Principles 
• human in the loop 
to use humans’ better dealing with unprecedented 
threats  
• reduction of complexity 
to limit the complexity to the necessary degree 
• reorganization 
to adjust structure and functioning to current 
situation 
• reparability 
to be prepared for recovery of origin functionality 
and performance 
• loose coupling 
to limit error propagation in complex, networked 
systems 
 
• inter-node interaction 
to ensure communication, cooperation, collaboration 
between nodes for a coordinated use of resources 
• reduce hidden interactions 
to avoid harmful interactions between nodes 
 
 
Case study: Collision Avoidance 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Cognitive skills of 
“human in the 
loop” 
Errors by “human 
in the loop” 
Pro human in the loop 
 as flexible supervisory instance 
 skills to detect known and unknown 
anomalies 
 capability to handle unintended surprises 
Contra human in the loop 
 studies speaks of 50 up to 90% of collisions 
and groundings caused by human errors 
 availability of qualified personnel is getting 
more difficult 
 occupational conditions 
 costs… 
 
AIS based 
vessel tracks 
2003-2008 
Resilience by tolerance and flexibility (2) 
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Most serious collisions and grounding 
(1990-2001) 
AIS tracks of collision scenario 26 
• calm weather with good visibility 
• ship bridges are properly manned 
• ships are equipped in compliance 
with SOLAS requirements 
 
 
Causes of collision scenario 26 
• collision between “Ferry” and “Bulker” 
occurred after “Bulker”  having initiated a 
course change to northeast  
• technical shortcomings in transmission 
schemes 
• faulty data transmitted 
 
 
Helpful resilience principles 
• 2nd human in the loop (VTS) acting as  
 independent monitoring instance  
 (loose coupling ) 
additional capacity to trigger additional 
demand on coordination and adjustment 
(reorganization of responsibilities, inter-
node interaction) 
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Summary 
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 Safe and efficient ship operation depends on (amongst others): 
 reliable provision of nautical data and information 
situation assessment and awareness as recurring task 
ability to adjust the operation to changes of internal and external conditions (including 
interfering influences, emerging threats,…) 
 
 Monitoring is one of the cornerstones of resilience and 
an essential prerequisite for situation awareness, needed: 
 to model behaviour/conditions for the design    to become resilient 
 to assess states and conditions     to control the  
 to detect internal/external threats    to protect resilience 
 to evaluate the effectivity of means  
managing/protecting the resilience    to maintain resilience 
 
 Resilience principles 
 the application is not new 
are recognized as general approaches to ensure resilience 
have to be concretized taking into account the specified resilience criteria 
 ….but becomes only effective based on the holistic consideration and 
coordination of interactions and dependencies on socio-technical 
level….    
